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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effect of the level of mandatory ge-
netically modiﬁed (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcome. We assume
vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous
in their cost savings from GMO adoption. Producers of non-GM crops face a probability of having their
harvest downgraded if gene ﬂow from GM ﬁelds makes its GMO content above the labeling threshold.
The government may impose to GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non-GM
ﬁelds in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex
post compensation to non-GMO farmers for proﬁt losses due to harvest downgrading, imposing GMO
farmers’ participation to a compensation fund via a tax on GM seeds. Assuming endogenous crop
choices and prices, we study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability of GMO producers on
market equilibrium as well as on global and interest group welfare.
Keywords: genetically modiﬁed organisms, coexistence, identity preservation, regulation, liability,
vertical differentiation, law and economics.
1 Introduction
Genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) have been controversial since they were ﬁrst commercialized.
They have been supported by many for their productivity gains and their perceived potential for incor-
porating enhanced agronomic or nutritional characteristics. But they have been opposed by many others on
ethical grounds or because of the health and environmental risks that GMOs pose. The ways in which public
authorities have regulated GMOs as a compromise between these two opposing groups have been inﬂuenced
by the political shape of the controversy. Public opinions and involvement of interest groups have been very
different among countries and, as a consequence, current GMO regulations vary greatly among countries.
Notably, in the US, GMO/non-GMO labelling is voluntary and coexistence between GMOs and non-GMOs
is not regulated. On the opposite end of the spectrum, in the European Union (EU), labelling of products
containing GMOs is mandatory, unless this presence is adventitious and less than 0:9% per ingredient; in
addition, traceability of GMOs is mandatory to facilitate their monitoring. More recently, European Com-
mission (EC) recommendation 2003/556 has instituted a framework to regulate the coexistence of GM and
non-GM crops in ﬁelds, a public policy that we analyze theoretically in this article.
The EC recommendation (2003/556/EC) on coexistence institutes freedom for both producers and con-
sumers to choose between GMOs and non-GMOs as a fundamental principle. It allows Member States to
impose mandatory regulations on farmers growing GM crops in order to limit gene ﬂow from their ﬁelds
to neighboring non-GM ﬁelds. Currently adopted national regulations rely mainly on isolation distances,
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1which deﬁne a minimum spacing between GM plantings and non-GM plantings dedicated to identity pre-
served (IP) non-GM markets. These isolation distances may be either planted with a non-GM variety of
the same crop, or planted with another crop, or left uncultivated. In some countries, instead of isolation
distances or as a complement to them, GMO farmers may choose to implement mandatory buffer zones,
created by planting strips at the outer border of the GM ﬁeld with a non-GM variety of the same crop, or
staggered sowing. In addition, since civil law is generally in the responsibility of the Member States, these
latter may also adopt speciﬁc provisions for liability in cases of GMO admixture and deﬁne procedures to
compensate the economic damage of non-GM producers who end up facing GMO admixture above the tol-
erance threshold in their harvest. The EC recommendation deﬁnes this economic damage as the difference
between the non-GM and GM product prices. Currently deﬁned liability rules for farmers cultivating GMOs
vary between states. In some countries these farmers must subscribe an insurance or a ﬁnancial guarantee
to feed a compensation fund, and are still liable even if they followed mandatory regulations set up to limit
the extent of admixture. Other countries have not introduced speciﬁc liability rules and rely on general civil
liability (Beckmann et al., 2006; Commission of the European Communities, 2003 and 2009).
From an economic perspective, the existence of GM crops makes production of non-GM crops more
costly if farmers are to sell their crop as non-GM in order to meet the demand from consumers who view
non-GM products as superior to GM products. In other words, the cultivation of GM crops creates a negative
externality on non-GMO producers who intend to prevent GMO commingling above the labeling threshold
in their harvest. As an activity that creates risks of harm to others, cultivation of GMOs presents a speciﬁc
difﬁculty: it is technically impossible to attribute the damage due to gene ﬂows to a precise producer. In
other words, the admixture related to gene ﬂows is a case of non-point source pollution, since it cannot be
traced back to a single or deﬁnite source. As a result, there is a chance that parties could not face the threat
of suit for harm done. Therefore, tort liability alone is not an adequate regulation to solve the risk of GM
gene ﬂow towards non GM crops and ex ante safety regulation is warranted (Shavell, 1984). In addition,
ex post tort liability is expected to be useful, since technical ex ante coexistence measures in ﬁelds do not
entirely eliminate the risk of gene ﬂow. These arguments call for coupling ex ante safety regulation with ex
post liability regulation at the farm level.
The necessity of a policy mix regulation is not speciﬁc to the issue of coexistence in ﬁelds. Indeed, in a
wide number of areas dealing with externality-generating activities, regulation and liability are used jointly
(Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson, 1990). Most forms of regulation combine ex ante and ex post components.
More, Shavell (1984) suggests that ex ante safety regulation and tort liability can complement each other
in that their joint use can optimally correct inefﬁciencies which appear when only one approach is used to
correct an externality.
While a substantial agronomic literature addresses the effects of alternative ex ante regulations on GMO
admixing (see e.g. Sanvido et al., 2008; Ceddia et al., 2009; Devos et al., 2008), there are yet few economic
studies analyzing the impacts of coexistence regulations. Market and welfare models of GMO introduction
in the presence of consumer aversion for GMOs usually assume that no coexistence regulation is in place
(Lapan and Moschini, 2004; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Lapan and Moschini, 2007; Desquilbet and Bul-
lock, 2009). Munro (2008) discusses policy options to restore efﬁciency with a stylized market model of
GM and non-GM crops in which GMO producers exert a spatial negative externality on non-GMO produc-
ers. He shows that market-based instruments such as a tax on GM seeds or a subsidy on non-GM production
may be insufﬁcient to ensure production efﬁciency. However, his discussion is not related to the current EU
regulatory framework for coexistence.
The analysis of Demont et al. (2008 and 2009) is more in line with the current EU regulation. These
authors discuss the effects of two alternative spatial ex ante coexistence regulations, namely, an isolation
distance around non-GM ﬁelds (so that any farmer willing to grow a GM crop within this distance has to
grow the non-GM variety of the same crop instead), and a pollen barrier (that is, a ﬁeld border between
a GM and a non-GM ﬁeld), of a smaller length than the isolation distance, that has to be planted with a
non-GM variety but harvested and marketed with the GM crop. The authors assume that this pollen barrier
2may be located either at the border of the GM ﬁeld, or at the border of the non-GM ﬁeld if the GMO farmer
compensates the non-GMO farmer for the cost of this barrier. With this setting, the authors argue that
small negotiable pollen barriers are preferable to large isolation distances, especially if market premiums
for non-GM IP crops are inexistent or low. The generality of their result is however questionable, for two
main reasons (Desquilbet and Bullock, 2010). First, these authors include only producers’ proﬁts, but not
consumers’ utility, in their analysis. Second, they adopt very restrictive assumptions, none of the non-GM
crop production being downgraded with any of the two instruments, GM and non-GM prices being kept
exogenous, and GMO adoption rates being kept exogenous as well.
In this paper, our aim is to contribute to this economic literature by analyzing the impact of ex ante and
ex post coexistence regulations on prices and market shares of GM and non-GM products, global welfare
and interest group welfare. We adopt a non-spatial stylized model where ex ante coexistence regulations are
isolation distances on which GMO producers have to grow the non-GM crop. For simplicity reasons, we
assume that GMO farmers comply perfectly with these technical measures (even though they bear additional
costs because of this regulation). We also assume that non-GMO producers do not take any measure on
their own to prevent GMO commingling. These producers face a probability of harvest downgrading that
decreases with the ex ante regulation level (higher isolation distances diminish admixture risks) and that
decreases with the regulatory tolerance threshold for GMO content in non-GM products. We assume that
when ex post regulation is in place, GMO farmers have to contribute to a compensation fund via a tax
on GM seeds, and that the government also participates to this compensation fund (via taxpayer money)
in order to compensate exactly non-GMO farmers facing harvest downgrading for their proﬁt loss. We
model GM and non-GM products as vertically differentiated on the consumer side. We use this model to
analyze the effects of ex ante and ex post coexistence regulatory policies on market and welfare outcomes. A
major characteristic of our model is to allow prices, GMO adoption rates and the extent of non-GM harvest
downgrading to be endogenous.
2 Model
We assume that the government deﬁnes a regulatory threshold s 2 [0;1] that denotes the proportion of
authorized adventitious presence of GMOs in Identity Preserved (IP) non-GM products: if s = 0, no GMO
presence at all is tolerated in the non-GM grain; while if s = 1, a 100% presence of GMOs is authorized
in the non-GM grain, in other words the threshold is never binding. We assume that producers are proﬁt-
maximizers and may produce four goods: an alternative crop a, or three different types of a particular grain.
The ﬁrst one is produced using a GM seed and is indexed by g. The second type of grain (indexed by n) is
producedfromanon-GMseedbutnotsoldasIP:eitheritisproducedbynon-GMproducersbutdowngraded
becauseitsGMOcontentisabovetheregulatorythreshold, orsimplysoldwithGMcropsinsituationswhere
non-GM producers have no economic advantage to sell it as IP; or it is produced by GMO producers on some
part of their area to comply with an ex ante coexistence regulation, and mixed up with the GMO harvest.
Consumers consider n and g to be the same product, that we call "regular" (indexed by r). The third type,
indexed by i, is the IP grain: it is grown from a non-GM seed by non-GM producers, and conforms with
labelling requirements (i.e. has a GMO content below the regulatory threshold). For simplicity reasons, we
concentrate on the agricultural stage, which is the target of EU coexistence regulations, assuming that no
additional commingling occurs at the handling and processing stages.
2.1 Consumers
As in Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and Lapan and Moschini (2007), we adopt a framework of vertical differ-
entiation consistent with Mussa and Rosen (1978), in which the non-GM product is the high-quality product
(all consumers appreciate equally the relative quality of GM and non-GM products but are heterogeneous
in their willingness to pay for a given quality). We assume a continuum of consumers characterized by a
3willingness to pay for quality  uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Each consumer consumes either the
GM good, or the non-GM good, or none, but never both. When consuming, a consumer consumes exactly
one unit. The quality of the non-GM good with zero GMO content is normalized to 1. Consuming the
regular product results in a discount in quality  < 1 (that is, the perceived quality of the GM good is 1 ).
When the regulatory threshold of authorized adventitious presence of GMOs in the non-GM good is s, we
assume that the perceived quality of the non-GM good is 1   s (the lower is the authorized presence of
GMOs in the non-GM good and the higher is its perceived quality). Then, the utility of the consumer with




(1   s)   pi when he buys one unit of the IP good,
(1   )   pr when he buys one unit of the regular good, and
0 when he buys one unit of the alternative good,
(1)
where pi is the per-unit grain price of the IP good (the IP price) and pr the per-unit grain price of the regular
good (the regular price).














All consumers characterized by  > j (j = r;i) obtain a higher utility from consuming good j rather than
the alternative good; while all consumers characterized by  > e  obtain a higher utility from consuming
the IP good rather than the regular good.2 Immediate calculation shows that the threshold values of  must
verify either r = i = e  (in which case any consumer is indifferent between consuming the IP good or the
regular good), or r < i < e , or e  < i < r. When s < 1, omitting the argument , our utility functions
imply the following demand functions:
For any s 2 [0;1);
Dr(pr;pi;s) =

min(e ;1)   r when r < i;




1   min(e ;1) when r < i;
1   min(i;1) when i  r:
(4)
With a regulatory threshold s = 1 (i.e. when 100% of GMO content is authorized in the IP product),
the IP label provides no information to consumers. Then, from our utility functions, there is a demand
D(p) = 1   min(
p
1 ;1) only for the cheapest product (or for any of the two products indifferently if their
price is the same).
2.2 Producers
We assume the existence of a continuum of producers characterized by a parameter , distributed uniformly
on [0;1], that represents per-unit production costs for the GM crop. We assume that all producers face
an overcost cn when they produce the non-GM crop (which total per-unit production costs are therefore
 + cn). We introduce the overcost of GM seed, w. Yield is identical for the two grain types n and g and is
normalized at one unit per acre, making per-acre costs and per-unit costs the same. The proﬁt obtained on
the alternative crop is normalized to zero. The IP farm price, p 
i , equals the per-unit consumer price minus
1Formally, and omitting the argument , these thresholds are functions 
r(pr), 
i(pi;s), e (pr;pi;s). We drop their arguments
to lighten the model writing.
2Our formulation is close to that adopted by Lapan and Moschini (2007).
4exogenous per-unit IP costs ci at the handling and processing stages, p 
i = pi   ci. We assume that the
regular farm price equals its consumer price (there are no IP costs for the regular good).
IntheabsenceofgeneﬂowfromGMtonon-GMcrops, per-unitproﬁtfunctionstaketheformg(pr;) =
pr      w and n(p 
i ;) = p 
i      cn. We now deﬁne these proﬁt functions in the presence of gene
ﬂow from GM to non-GM crops and when the government implements a regulatory threshold of maximum
authorized GMO content in non-GM crops and a coexistence regulation.
2.2.1 Downgrading of non-GM production and policy parameters in the presence of gene ﬂow
The government may implement an ex ante coexistence regulation that mandates each GMO producer to
undertake a level of effort e 2 [0;1), which represents a proportion of his land that he has to plant with the
non-GM variety (which is then sold as regular together with the GM production). This formulation captures
in a stylized fashion ex ante regulations such as isolation distances or pollen barriers, which impose GMO
producers not to grow GMOs too close to non-GM ﬁelds.
Non-GM producers sell their harvest as non-GM IP, at price p 
i , if its GMO content is less that the
regulatory maximum threshold s. However, if its GMO content is above this threshold, this production is
downgraded, that is, sold as regular at price pr. Noting the aggregate production of the GM good as Qg, we
model the probability of downgrading as a function h(e;s;Qg) 2 [0;1] which is decreasing in its two ﬁrst
arguments (the stricter the ex ante regulation, the lower the GMO content in non-GM harvest and therefore
the proportion of downgrading; and the lower the authorized threshold of adventitious presence of GMOs,
the higher the proportion of grain that does not meet this threshold) and increasing in its third argument. We
assume that if the effort of GMO producers is maximum and/or if 100% GMO is authorized in the GMO
product, all the non-GM production meets the standard (h(1;s;Qg) = h(e;1;Qg) = 0). We deﬁne the
probability of downgrading with the following functional form that veriﬁes all these properties:
h(e;s;Qg) = (1   e)(1   s)Ind(Qg); (5)
where Ind(Qg) is an indicator function equal to zero if no GMOs are produced and 1 otherwise
(Ind(Qg) = 0 if Qg = 0 and 1 if Qg > 0).
The government may also implement an ex post regulation by exactly compensating the proﬁt losses




0 if no ex post regulation is in place,
1 if an ex post regulation is in place.
Each non-GM producer faces a probability h(e;s;Qg) that his crop gets downgraded. Given the con-
tinuum of producers facing the same probability, h(e;s;Qg) is also the proportion of total production by
non-GM producers that gets downgraded. We assume that when an ex post regulation is in place (L = 1),
the regulator uses two instruments to compensate proﬁt losses of non-GM producers due to downgrading, a
per-unit tax t on GM seed and a governement participation with taxpayer money.
2.2.2 Per-unit proﬁt and aggregate supply functions
We denote by g(:) the proﬁt obtained by GMO producers who plant GMOs on a proportion (1 e) of their
area and the non-GM good on a proportion e of their area. Let n(:) denote the expected proﬁt of non-GMO
producers. Given that the government implements the instruments s (regulatory threshold for GMO content
in the non-GM grain), e (ex ante effort mandated on GMO producers) and L (ex post liability of GMO
producers), omitting the argument cn, the per-unit proﬁt functions take the form:
g(pr;e;L;t;) = pr      (1   e)w   ecn   (1   e)Lt;
n(pr;p 
i ;Qg;s;e;L;) = p 
i      cn   (1   L)(p 
i   pr)h(e;s;Qg) (6)
a = 0
5We deﬁne the threshold values i, i = g;n, so that all producers characterized by  < i obtain a
higher proﬁt from producing good i rather than the alternative good (i(:) > a ,  < i):

g = pr   (1   e)w   ecn   (1   e)Lt;
n = p 
i   cn   (1   L)(p 
i   pr)h(e;s;Qg):
(7)
From the proﬁt functions deﬁned above, it is immediate that when n > g all producers obtain a higher
proﬁt from producing the non-GM good (n) rather than the GM good with the non-GM good on some part
of the area (g); inversely, when n < g, all producers obtain a higher proﬁt from n than from g; while
when n = g, all producers obtain the same proﬁt from n and g.
Let Pg and Pn denote the domains where the proﬁt-maximizing choice of producers is to produce,
respectively, the GM good combined with the non-GM good on the proportion of area e, and the non-GM
good. Using the above properties, our proﬁt functions imply the following proﬁt domains:
when n > g;

Pg = ;
Pn = f 2 [0;1] :   ng
when n = g; Pg [ Pn = f 2 [0;1] :   gg
when n < g;






i denote quantities supplied of goods g, n and i. On the domain Pg, a proportion e
of production is non-GM, because of the obligation for GMO producers to implement isolation distances
sown with non-GM seeds. The remainder, that is, a proportion 1   e of production, is GM. On the domain
Pn, a proportion 1   h(:) is sold as IP while a proportion h(:) gets downgraded because of excessive GM
commingling. Our proﬁt functions therefore imply the following supply correspondence:

































Given the model’s parameters , cn, ci, w and the policy instruments s, e, L, t, we have that pr, p 
i , pi, Qg
2 R4
+ is an equilibrium if: (a) Qs
g = Qg, (b) pi = p 





each producer maximizes proﬁts); (d) Qs
g + Qs
n = Dr(pr;pi;s) and Qs
i = Di(pr;pi;s) (each consumer
maximizes utility and markets clear).
3 The effects of ex ante versus ex post coexistence regulation
We now study several forms of regulation: no regulation, a regulatory maximum threshold for the adventi-
tious presence of GMOs in the non-GMO production, ex ante regulation in addition, and ex ante regulation
with ex post liability.
3.1 Benchmark cases: equilibrium without GMOs; equilibrium with GMOs and no regu-
lation
In a benchmark situation in which GMOs have not been introduced (and therefore in which non-GMO
producers bear no costs of IP and non-GMO consumers perceive no discount of quality), the non-GM good
6provides a per-unit proﬁt p  cn, and a per-unit utility  p. The equilibrium condition is p cn = 1 p
and the equilibrium price is p0 = 1+cn
2 .
Consider now the situation where GMOs are introduced without any regulation, that is, no label (or
equivalently s = 1 in our model) and no coexistence regulation (e = L = t = 0). The GM and non-
GM goods provide per-unit proﬁts g = pr      w and n = pi   cn    (ci = 0 since there is no
segregation costs), respectively, while consumers demand only the cheapest product, with D(p) = 1 
p
1 .
In this situation, the IP good would be produced only if it were cheaper to produce than the regular good.
In equilibrium, only the IP good is produced and consumed if w  cn and the equilibrium price is equal to
1 
2 (1 + cn). If w < cn, only the GM good is produced and consumed and the equilibrium price is then
1 
2 (1 + w).
3.2 Equilibrium with labeling and ex ante coexistence regulation
Proposition 1 below summarizes all possible equilibria with labeling (s < 1) and ex ante regulation (e  0)
when no ex post regulation is in place (L = 0).
Proposition 1. Assume that s < 1, e  0 and L = 0.
A. In any equilibrium in which the GM and the IP good coexist, prices are given by
pr = 1 
2 (1 + (1   e)w + ecn) and pi = 1 
2 (1 + (1   e)w + ecn) +
(1 e)(cn w)
1 (1 e)(1 s) + ci.
Producers characterized by 0    g (with g = n) produce either the GM good with the manda-
tory isolation distance, or the non-GM good with some downgrading (all of them are indifferent between
these two production choices). Consumers characterized by r    e  consume the regular good, while
consumers characterized by e  <   1 consume the IP good. Such a coexistence equilibrium arises if and
only if:
(1   s) 
(1   e)(cn   w)
1   (1   e)(1   s)
+ ci (C1 
0 )
(1   s) <
2   
1 + (1   e)w + ecn

(1   e)(cn   w)




B. In any equilibrium in which only the GM good is produced, the regular price is also
pr = 1 
2 (1 + (1   e)w + ecn). Producers characterized by 0    g all produce the GM good
(sowing the non-GM seed on a proportion e of their area), while consumers characterized by r    1
consume the regular good. Such an equilibrium arises if and only if:
(1   s) <
(1   e)(cn   w)
1   (1   e)(1   s)
+ ci (C1+
0 )
(1   e)w + ecn < 1    (C30)
C. In any equilibrium in which only the IP good is produced, the IP equilibrium price is
pi = 1 s
2 s(1 + cn + ci). Producers characterized by 0    n all produce the IP good, which is
consumed by consumers characterized by i    1. Such an equilibrium arises if and only if:
[(1   e)(2   s)   (1   s)]cn   (1   e)(2   s)w + ci(2   )  (1   s); (C40)
cn + ci < 1   s: (C5)
Proof. See Appendix ??.
We note from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium domains with GM production only and with coexistence
have a common frontier, with the opposite conditions (C1+
0 ) and (C1 
0 ), while there is no common frontier
between the equilibrium domains with coexistence and with IP production only. Thus, for some value of
7the parameters, there are multiple equilibria with coexistence equilibrium. Multiple equilibrium case results
from the existence of the indicator function in the deﬁnition of the non-GM downgrading: some part of the
IP production is downgraded if and only if the GM production is positive, which introduces a discontinuity
between the equilibria with and without GMOs produced.
It is interesting to study how conditions (Ck0) change when the level of ex ante regulation e increases.
We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1.  When ci >
(1 s)(1+w)
2  , an increase in the level of ex ante regulation may cause the
emergence of an equilibrium with coexistence, from a situation where only the GM good (combined
with non-GM production on a proportion of area e) was produced and consumed in equilibrium.
 When ci < minf
(1 s)(1+w)
2  ; (1   s)g, an increase in the level of ex ante regulation may cause the
emergence of an equilibrium with coexistence, from a situation where only the IP good was produced
and consumed in equilibrium.
 For some values of the same parameters (ci > maxf
(1 s)(1+w)
2  ; (1   s)g and ci <
(1 s)(1+w)
2  ),
an increase in e may cause an equilibrium in which GMOs and IP coexisted to disappear in favor of
only one of these productions (GMOs or IP).
It is interesting to discuss the implication of this corollary in the light of the recent economic literature on
coexistence regulation. As indicated by the ﬁrst part of this corollary, the absence of IP goods on the market
when coexistence is not regulated does not necessarily indicate that consumers are not interested in them.
It may simply indicate that gene ﬂow in ﬁelds, and the implied downgrading of IP production, makes such
production too expensive in the absence of regulation. But this production choice may become proﬁtable
when coexistence measures imposed on GMO producers reduce the probability of gene ﬂow towards non-
GM ﬁelds. This endogeneity of production choices therefore makes the analysis more complicated than
what is suggested for example by Devos et al. (2008) when they state that
“In markets where consumers are unwilling to pay signiﬁcant price premiums for GM-free maize, there
is no coexistence issue stricto sensu. Under market conditions where hardly any GM-free gains can be
captured, wide and ﬁxed isolation distances may generate substantial opportunity costs for maize producers
who forego GM gains due to proximity to non-GM maize ﬁelds, and who are hardly capturing any com-
pensatory GM-free gains. Moreover, this loss is not proportional to the weak incentives to supply non-GM
crops and to ensure coexistence with non-GM crops.”
Because producers’ incentives to supply GM or non-GM crops are endogenous and subject to change
when regulation is introduced, the absence of market signals for IP crops in the absence of coexistence
regulation is not an indicator that such coexistence policy is not desirable.
In an equilibrium with coexistence, the utility of a consumer of the regular good is (1   )   pr, the
utility of a consumer of the IP good is (1   s)   pi, and the proﬁt of a producer of the GM or non-GM
good is pr   ecn   (1   e)w   . From Proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. When the price of the GM seed is lower than the non-GM crop over-cost (w < cn), in an
equilibrium in which GMOs coexist with the IP good, an increase in the level of ex ante regulation causes
the regular price to increase and the IP price to decrease, which favors consumers of the IP good, and hurts
consumers of the regular good as well as producers.
It also causes a decrease in the aggregate (regular + IP) production, as the resultant of a lower regular
production level and a higher IP production level.
Considering a situation where GMOs are the less costly technology without any regulation, at initial
market prices, the ﬁrst effect of the ex ante coexistence regulation is to force GMO farmers to dedicate some
of their area to isolation distances sown with non-GM seeds, decreasing their proﬁtability while leaving
their total production of regular good unchanged (since GM and non-GM goods have identical yields in our
8setting). The aggregate production of IP producers is unchanged too, but the proportion of their production
that gets downgraded because of excessive GMO commingling decreases. Therefore, as a ﬁrst effect, at ini-
tial market prices, the proﬁtability of the GM crop decreases while the proﬁtability of the IP crop increases.
Also, the regular production decreases and the IP production increases (with the total production being un-
changed), which tends to make the regular price increase and the IP price decrease. These second-effect
price changes then increase the proﬁtability of the regular crop and decrease the proﬁtability of the IP crop
(these two proﬁtabilities have to become equal again for a coexistence equilibrium to be sustained after the
regulation introduction).
The aggregate welfare level, which is the sum of producers’ proﬁts, utility of consumers of the regular
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Deriving this welfare level with respect to e when e = 0, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When the price of the GM seed is lower than the non-GM crop over-cost (w < cn), in an
equilibrium with coexistence of GMOs and IP, the introduction of ex ante regulation is welfare-increasing if









(cn   w)(cn   w + cis)
(1   s)s3
> 0
This condition is more likely to hold if the aversion towards GMOs, , and the GM seed cost, w, are large,
and the overcost of non-GM production and the IP cost, cn and ci, are small (while there is no general
property on the level of the regulatory threshold, s, under which this condition is more likely to hold).
The possible welfare-increasing effect of the ex ante regulation arises because this regulation makes
it possible to internalize on GMO producers some of the externality that they exert towards IP producers
through gene ﬂow, which production is preferred by consumers.
3.3 Equilibrium with labeling, ex ante and ex post coexistence regulation
Proposition 3 below summarizes all possible equilibria with labeling (s < 1) and ex ante as well as ex post
coexistence regulation (e  0, L = 1, t  0).
Proposition 3. Assume that s < 1, e  0, L = 1 and t  0.
A. In any equilibrium in which the GM and the IP good coexist, prices are given by
pr = 1 
2 (1 + ecn + (1   e)(w + t)) and pi =
1  ecn (1 e)(w+t)
2  + cn + ci.
Such a coexistence equilibrium arises if and only if:
(1   s)  (1   e)(cn   w   t) + ci (C1 
1 )
(1   s) <
2   
1 + (1   e)(w + t) + ecn
[(1   e)(cn   w   t) + ci] (C4+
1 )
B. In any equilibrium in which only the GM good is produced, the regular price is
pr = 1 
2 (1+ecn +(1 e)(w +t)), as in the coexistence case. Such an equilibrium arises if and only
if:
(1   s) < (1   e)(cn   w   t) + ci (C1+
1 )
(1   e)(w + t) + ecn < 1    (C31)
C. In any equilibrium in which only the IP good is produced, the IP equilibrium price is
9pi = 1 s
2 s(1 + cn + ci). Such an equilibrium arises if and only if:
2   
1 + (1   e)(w + t) + ecn
[(1   e)(cn   w   t) + ci]  (1   s) (C4 
1 )
ci + cn < 1   s (C5)
In any of these equilibria, production and consumption choices depending on the values of parameters
 and  are deﬁned as in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix ??.
In this case, there is no multiple equilibrium because IP producers are fully compensated in case of
downgrading; the indicator function does not appear here. Coexistence equilibrium appears when the costs
related to the production and distribution of the IP good (cn and ci) are relatively similar to the costs related
to the production and the regulation of the GM grain ((1   e)w and (1   e)t).
In our model, ex post regulation consists in fully compensating IP producers for their proﬁt losses if
they have to downgrade some part of their production due to excessive GMO commingling, and is funded
by taxpayer money and/or a tax on GM seeds. When such regulation is funded by taxpayer money alone, that
is, when the GM seed tax t is set to zero, it is immediate that condition C1 
1 is looser than its counterpart
in the absence of ex post regulation (that is, C1 
0 ), while conditions C1+
1 and C41 are stricter that their
counterparts (C1+
0 and C20). Moreover, the introduction of a participation of GMO producers in the way
of a GM seed tax (that is, the introduction of a positive t) makes condition C1 
1 even looser and conditions
C1+
1 and C21 even stricter. This implies the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For a given level of ex ante regulation, the introduction of ex post regulation, funded by
taxpayers and/or by a tax on GM seeds, may cause the emergence of an equilibrium with coexistence, or
may cause an equilibrium in which GMOs and IP coexisted to disappear, in a similar way to the effects of
the introduction of ex ante regulation described above.
In an equilibrium with coexistence, the utility of a consumer of the regular good is (1   )   pr, the
utility of a consumer of the IP good is (1   s)   pi, and the proﬁt of a producer of the GM or non-GM
good is pr   ecn      (1   e)t   (1   e)w.
Corollary 4. In an equilibrium with coexistence of GMOs and IP, for a given level of ex ante regulation, the
introduction of ex post regulation funded by taxpayer money only leaves the regular price unchanged while it
causes the IP price to decrease. It causes an increase in the utility of IP consumers and a cost to taxpayers,
while it affects neither producers’ proﬁts, nor the utility of regular consumers. The total production level is
kept unchanged, with the IP quantity higher and the regular quantity lower. The non-GM production that
gets downgraded is proportional to the total IP production and therefore increases as well.
Given that such ex post regulation is in place, and keeping the level of ex ante regulation unchanged, the
introduction of a GM seed tax as as substitute to taxpayer funding of downgrading compensation induces an
increase in the regular price and a decrease in the IP price. It causes an increase in IP consumers’ utility,
and a decrease in producers’ proﬁts and regular consumers’ utility. The total production level decreases,
with the IP quantity higher and the regular quantity lower. The non-GM production that gets downgraded
increases again.
The aggregate welfare level is the sum of producers’ proﬁts and utility of both types of consumers,
minus the damage funded by taxpayer money. The total compensation to IP producers for the downgrading
they incur is h
1 h(1  e )(pi  ci  pr), of which (e   r   h
1 h(1  e ))(1 e)t is paid by the GM seed tax
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(1   e )(pi   ci   pr) + (e    r  
h
1   h
(1   e ))(1   e)t:
The effect of the introduction of ex post regulation funded by taxpayers only is obtained by comparing
W1 jt=0 with W0 that was deﬁned in the section above, that is, the welfare level with ex ante regulation
only. Then, the effect of the GM seed tax is obtained by examining the sign of the derivative of W1 with
respect to the tax level t. Both effects are welfare decreasing, as summarized in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4. In an equilibrium with coexistence of GMOs and IP, for a given level of ex ante regulation,
the introduction of ex post regulation funded by taxpayer money only is necessarily welfare-decreasing.
Given that such taxpayer-funded ex post regulation is in place, aggregate welfare decreases even further if a
GM seed tax of any level is implemented in order to contribute to the funding of compensations for non-GM
crop downgrading.
This proposition indicates that the implementation of taxpayer-funded ex post regulation increases the
utility of IP consumers only at the cost of a higher expense for taxpayers and is therefore never a warranted
policy option. Introducing a GM tax creates a distortion that makes the welfare decrease even worse. This
resultisnotsurprisinggiventhattheexpost regulation, whetheritisfundedbytaxpayersorGMOproducers,
gives no incentive to GMO producers to decrease the amount of damage suffered by IP producers. This
effect is a direct consequence of our assumption that GMO producers never undertake any effort to decrease
gene ﬂow in the absence of a restrictive ex ante policy. It is in accordance with the non-point source nature
of GM gene ﬂow, which makes it possible for any individual producer to escape the threat of being held
individually liable for its actions, therefore giving him no incentive to internalize the externality that he
exerts on producers wishing to identity-preserve their non-GM crop.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the effects of ex ante versus ex post regulation of GM / non-GM coexistence
in ﬁelds. To this aim, we have deﬁned a framework that allows to make prices, and therefore production and
consumption choices, endogenous. Our model relies on a classical vertical differentiation assumption on
the consumer side. In addition, it captures the main effects of coexistence regulation on the production side.
GM gene ﬂow is a non-point source pollution and therefore GMO producers do not have the appropriate
individual incentives to correct the externality that they exert on non-GM producers (which we model in an
extreme way by assuming that GMO producers never undertake any effort to reduce their gene ﬂow unless
they are mandated to do so). Ex ante technical measures such as isolation distances allow to reduce GM gene
ﬂow, and therefore the possible downgrading of some part of their production experienced by non-GM IP
producers (we make the restrictive assumption that these producers never undertake any effort on their own
to reduce the risk of gene ﬂow). But these technical measures are costly for GMO producers, because they
force them to give up the more proﬁtable GMO production on some part of their area. Ex ante regulation
reduces but does not eliminate the risk of excessive gene ﬂow. Ex post compensation to non-GMO producers
for their proﬁt losses due to downgrading may be implemented by a public funding and/or by the revenue
generated by a GM seed tax.
The literature on the economic analysis of law generally recommands a combination of ex ante and ex
post regulatory instruments. Our results are not in accordance with this general ﬁnding. On the contrary, we
ﬁnd with our model that ex ante technical measures may be welfare increasing as long as consumers care
enough for non-GM goods and as long as GMO cost reductions and IP handling overcosts are modest, but
11that ex post regulation can only deteriorate welfare, whether its funding is public or through a tax on GM
seeds.
Further analysis could usefully analyze how robust is this result. Notably, our model is very simple on
the production side, with all producers being identical. As a consequence, in the type of equilibrium that
is of interest for us, that is, the one where GM and non-GM IP goods coexist, all producers are indifferent
between their two possible production choices, which are either GMO production combined with mandatory
technical measures, or non-GM production with some probability of harvest downgrading. The proportion
of producers that enter into each production type is determined by consumers’ demand. As a consequence,
with our two possible implementations of ex post regulation, every producer suffers a proﬁt loss due to
such regulation - while it would be more realistic to make it possible that IP producers beneﬁt from ex post
regulation. This extension could be performed by introducing some heterogeneity among farmers on the
overcost of IP production ci. It is left for future research.
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